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ABSTRACT. The severe tensions between conservation and development are illustrated by events in
Malinau Dstrict (Kalimantan, Indonesia). Conservationists decry proposed plans for logging and conversion
of pristine tropical forest to oil palm (Elaeis guineensis). Although the local government is willing to declare
the district a “conservation district,” at the same time, it shows interest in oil palm conversion. This article
explores the impact of the potential conversion of 500 000 ha of forest to oil palm on forest cover, in-
migration, and the local economy in Malinau. The simulation model was developed using STELLA®
software, and relies on a combination of empirical data, data from the literature, and stakeholder perceptions.
If a company were to clear the forest for timber without planting oil palm (as commonly happens), poverty
levels are likely to rise rather than decline over the long term. If large-scale oil palm plantations were to
be established, they could yield significant benefits to local authorities. However, such development would
induce massive employment-driven migration, with wide-ranging consequences for the current inhabitants
of the region. By visualizing and quantifying these trade-offs between conservation and development, the
model stimulates debate and information exchange among conservationists, development actors, and district
authorities so that well-informed choices can be made.
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INTRODUCTION
Environmentalists worldwide are concerned about
the conversion of pristine Indonesian rainforests to
oil palm (Elaeis guineensis). Between 1980 and
2000, global palm oil production increased by 360%
to 20.9 million tonnes in 2000 (Koh and Wilcove
2007) and it is forecast that global demand will
double in the next 20 to 30 years (Sargeant 2001,
Reinhardt et al. 2007). Mittermeier and Bowles
(1993) consider the forests in Kalimantan to be one
of the world’s 15 tropical rainforest hotspots.
Malinau is one of the newly designated districts in
East Kalimantan Province, Indonesia (Fig. 1). Over
95% of the 4.3 million-ha area is still covered with
forest (Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) Malinau,
unpublished data). The local authorities recognize
its value and have declared Malinau a “conservation
district” (one of only three in Indonesia), although
at the same time, they have welcomed palm oil
investments.
In June 2005, the Indonesian Minister of Agriculture
revealed a government proposal for the world’s
largest oil palm plantation of 1.8 million ha along
the Malaysia–Kalimantan border, cutting through
three national parks. Campaigns and lobbying by
civil society, Indonesian media and foreign
diplomats forced the Indonesian government to
revise its position on the mega-project but, although
the Indonesian president acknowledges that
conservation concerns should be considered, he
continues to support oil palm development (Wakker
2006). This is understandable considering the role
of palm oil in the Indonesian economy. In 2004, the
export value of palm oil in Indonesia comprised
US$4.1 billion—or 1.7% of the Indonesian gross
national income (Koh and Wilcove 2007)—and
roughly 4.5 million people rely on palm oil estates:
900 000 people through direct employment and
another 3.6 million through downstream processing,
service industries, and remittances (Sargeant 2001).
Susila (2004) found that oil palm activities
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Fig. 1. Geographical features of Malinau District (Source: Topografi Kodam (TOPDAM) 2004 and
Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah (Bappeda) 2002).
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contribute 5–11 million IDR yearly or over 63% of
smallholder household incomes in Kampar (Riau)
and Musi Banyuasin (South Sumatra), and stated
that the small proportion of poor people (<10%) in
oil palm communities in these sites is an indication
of the commodities’ contribution to poverty
alleviation. Conservationists face big challenges
given the monetary benefits of oil palm.
For Malinau, we examine the scenario of clearing
500 000 ha of forest for oil palm and its
consequences for local livelihood income, district
revenue, and land-cover change. Given the
employment created by such development, we also
examine potential migration into Malinau. The aim
of the paper is to simulate landscape dynamics in
order to understand conservation and development
trade-offs from the perspectives of different
stakeholders.
METHODS AND PROCESS
Simulation models and participatory modeling can
be useful in stimulating discussion about the future,
and can contribute to decisions about complex
landscapes (Sayer and Campbell et al. 2004). Sayer
and Campbell (2004) argue for the use of
exploratory or scoping (as opposed to predictive)
models, with model building and outcomes
stimulating discussion amongst different stakeholders
who have different perspectives on the trade-offs
between conservation and development. We stress
that this is a scoping model, not a predictive model.
The scoping model was built using the dynamic,
userfriendly modeling software STELLA® v.8
(High Performance Systems 1996). Initially, the
elements for a model were shared with researchers
from the Center of International Forestry Research
(CIFOR) and a scoping model was produced that
simulated land-cover change (Sayer and Campbell
2004, Lynam et al. 2003). The results of the early
simulations were discussed with researchers and
staff of the district, including the district head
(Bupati). This gave the modelers feedback on
priority issues, and the model was then further
developed. A workshop was then convened with 12
representatives from the district agencies at which
available information and data were shared and
discussed. This was followed by smaller workshops
and modeling training with those officials interested
in pursuing the modeling. In early 2007, the results
were presented to CIFOR researchers and generated
much discussion. In late 2007, the scenario results
were shared with district officials and the district
head. More information on the modeling procedure
can be found at: http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/conserv
ation/_ref/home/index.htm.
The model includes variables covering land use,
human populations, employment, forest and
plantation economics, and district income. To
identify the current status of livelihoods in Malinau
district, we used data from the district statistical
office (Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS) and data from
CIFOR researchers working in Malinau between
2000 and 2007. All monetary values are reported in
Indonesian Rupiah (IDR), where ca. US$1 = IDR
9500. The sensitivity of the model’s response to
some key variables (income from agriculture, oil
palm, and timber salaries, emigration and
immigration rate) has been explored by changing
their values +/-20%.
LAND USE, LAND-USE SCENARIOS, AND
LAND-COVER CHANGE
Main Land Use and Forest Types
With decentralization in 1999, land-use allocation
has come increasingly under the control of the
district government, although allocation in the
forestry service area is still legally under the central
government. Conservation and protection forest
form a large part of Malinau, dominated by the
Kayan Mentarang National Park (Table 1). The
forests in the non-forestry service area and
“conversion” forest are forests allocated for
conversion to other uses (e.g., agriculture,
plantations).
For the model, we have divided forests into primary
forest, logged-over primary forest, secondary
forest, and degraded forest (Fig. 2). Degraded forest
comprises <5-year-old bush fallow (following
abandoned swidden cultivation) and land cleared
for mining. Based on the district offices’
documentation on shifting cultivation for the years
2002–2006 and on the mining area, degraded forest
occupies about 16 000 ha at the start of the
simulation. Secondary forest comprises between 5-
and 40-year-old bush fallow and very intensely
logged forest. The intensely logged forest is largely
a consequence of large- and small-scale conversion
permits—IPK and IPPK, respectively. Based on
documentation in the district offices and estimation
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Table 1. Land-use allocation for Malinau (source: Dinas Kehutanan dan Perkebunan Kab. Malinau 2006,
TGHK revised 2002 for mining area)
Land-use allocation 2006 Area (ha)
Total Area, Malinau District 4 262 070
Non-Forestry Service land 518 927
Of which:
Mining concession (2002) 19 919
Currently under swidden agriculture (dryland paddy) 6 131
Currently under permanent agriculture (wetland paddy, crops, vegetables,
fruits, and estate crops)
12 816
Forestry Service land 3 743 143
Of which:
Conversion forest 225 828
Production forest 453 653
Limited production forest (on steep slopes) 1 280 836
Protection forest (national park and forest reserves) 1 782 825
of land under swidden cultivation over the period
1967—2002, secondary forest covers about 120 000
ha at the start of the simulation.
Secondary forest >40 years old is categorized as
logged-over primary forest, although under the oil
palm simulations, we assume no secondary forest
is converted to primary forest due to increased forest
clearing. Roughly 20% of the landscape (about 950
000 ha) was logged by 2004 (logged-over primary
forest). The remaining 75% of the landscape (about
3 157 000 ha) is categorized as primary forest at the
start of the simulation.
Logging and Conversion Permits
With decentralization, district officials gained
greater control over forest resources, often
extending well beyond their official legal authority.
They started issuing logging permits for small
concessions (IPPK) in areas supposedly classified
as conversion forest (Obidzinski and Barr 2003).
There was minimal regulation of the subsequent
logging. Barr et al. (2001:13) report on the
enthusiasm of a palm oil company manager about
the decentralization process stating, “...operations
will be much smoother and more efficient if
companies can deal straight with the Bupati.”
A frequent practice observed in Indonesia is that
IPK (permit for large-scale forest conversion)
concession holders do the logging, but have no
intention of converting the area into plantations. Of
2.5 million ha cleared for oil palm in East and West
Kalimantan, only 20% had been planted by 2005
(Wakker 2006), with the remaining area thought to
be cleared mainly for its timber. In the neighboring
district Berau, the governor is under prosecution for
“abuse of power” because, between 1999 and 2002,
he issued a permit to plant a million hectares of oil
palm, and the company that received the permit
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Fig. 2. Major land-use sectors captured in the model, showing the potential land-use transformations.
cleared the land, made use of the wood, but never
planted oil palm (Castaño 2006). In Malinau, there
have also been major proposals for oil palm where
land is regarded as not suitable for oil palm, being
remote, very steep, and with infertile soils (Basuki
and Sheil 2005, Lynam et al. 2006), leading to the
belief that the proposed development of oil palm is
a guise for timber harvesting. Neighboring districts
closer to the sea with extended lowlands would be
more cost-effective investments for oil palm in the
short term. However, the road network is rapidly
expanding, with new roads now linking Malinau to
Nunukan and Bulungan districts, so markets are
effectively becoming more accessible and oil palm
investments more likely to happen, although some
believe that the land capacity is such that oil palm
will not be economically viable (Basuki and Sheil
2005).
Oil Palm Scenarios
Currently there are no plantations in Malinau. In our
simulation, we assume the development of oil palm
will start in 5 years’ time (2012). To explore the
potential future impact of oil palm development, we
have used four scenarios:
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1. No oil palm development (as at present);
 
2. Forest clearing, but no oil palm planted (as
has occurred elsewhere);
 
3. Forest clearing and oil palm plantation,
assuming low employment rates, and
 
4. Forest clearing and oil palm plantatin,
assuming high employment rates.
 
 In all scenarios, HPH/IUPHHK logging (large-
scale concessions using less intensive logging)
occurs throughout the simulation, starting with
current levels and increasing by 50% toward the end
of the simulation.
In scenarios 2–4, five logging permits for forest
conversion are issued for an area of 100 000 ha each.
Permits for plantation production are usually given
for a 25- to 30-year period, and after that, they can
be extended or terminated. The timber clearing
through IPK permits in scenarios 2–4 is assumed to
take place over a period of 20 years (from 2012–
2032 in the simulation), increasing in intensity over
time (too few workers and equipment are available
in the first years). Thus, after 25 years, 500 000 ha
of forest will be cleared.
Under scenario 2, we simulate “timber speculators,”
who do intensive logging in primary logged-over
forest, converting it to secondary forest. We assume
that they mainly use the non-forestry service area
and the area allocated as conversion forest (Table
1) although there will be some use of the permanent
forest domain (about 70 000 ha). Furthermore, we
assume that the company gives logging jobs to
migrants only, and only pays a minimum
compensation fee of IDR 5000/m3 to villages (see
below).
In scenarios 3 and 4, we simulate more responsible
companies that plant the full 500 000 ha, 40% from
secondary forest and 60% from primary logged-
over forest, all of which is non-forestry service area
and conversion forest. We assume the plantations
are largely located in lowlands closer to transport
routes (e.g., close to Malinau town). Scenario 3
assumes an employment of 0.1 jobs per ha of oil
palm, which corresponds to current employment
figures in Malaysian oil palm plantations (van
Noordwijk, pers. comm. 2007). Scenario 4 assumes
an average of 0.2 jobs per ha of oil palm,
corresponding with Indonesian contexts (Sargeant
2001). It is assumed villages get a fee of 20 000
IDR/m3 for the timber removed.
The timber compensation fees of IDR 5000–20 000/
m3 are a low to moderate estimate as Palmer (2004)
mentions that fees can go up to IDR 50 000/m3, and
Barr et al. (2001) measured up to IDR 30 000 IDR/
m3. The IDR 5000 fee follows an example in
Malinau mentioned by Barr et al. (2001: 32).
Agriculture
For many years, livelihoods in Malinau district have
been dominated by agriculture, hunting, and
gathering. Of the local population, about 75% live
outside the district capital, with the majority being
swidden cultivators. A few are hunter-gatherers, but
at least 80%–85% of these Punan households
undertake farming (Levang et al. 2005). Despite the
prevalence of agriculture, its formal contribution to
the district’s economy was only 6% in 2002 (BPS
2003 in Andrianto 2006). The population sub-model
drives the rate of increase or decrease in farming
households, and this feeds directly to the area
farmed. A slight shift from jobs in agriculture to
jobs in the service and trade industry is modeled as
a result of urbanization.
We distinguish between permanent and swidden
cultivation (Table 1). The former is intensive crop
and tree production. Swidden cultivation is
prevalent. It starts with the conversion of logged-
over primary forest to dryland rice cultivation. After
about 2 years, when crop yields are low and weed
infestation increases, farmers abandon the field and
it becomes bush fallow. At the moment, the pressure
on the land is so low that bush fallow is left to grow
into secondary forest, which is only turned into
swidden fields again when it is very old and
resembles primary forest. However, under the oil
palm scenario, primary and old secondary forest in
the vicinity of the villages will become scarce, and
thus, farmers will be forced to reduce the fallow
period, which will result in higher levels of weed
infestation and lower per hectare swidden yields
(modeled to drop by 30%).
Mining
A small portion of the landscape is allocated to coal
mining (Table 1), but of that, only about 30% has
been mined. Recently mining activities ceased
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because of the costs of extraction. It is difficult to
predict future mining activities, but given the high
transport costs in Malinau, we have assumed only
a small annual increase in the area mined (e.g., from
1000 to about 2000 ha/year under scenario 4). This
increase is due to population increase, where a
proportion of the unemployed commence artisanal
mining.
Forest Products
People in Malinau depend heavily on forest
products for their livelihoods. Levang et al. (2005)
found that 72% of the local Punan people collect
forest products, but only 16% rely on it for their
main cash income. Their study shows that the mean
annual income of a Punan household from
agriculture is IDR 1.67–2.25 million, whereas that
from forest products is IDR 1.72–4.56 million,
depending on the remoteness of the villages. These
figures apply better to the more remote hunter-
gatherer communities. According to Pambudhi et
al. (2004), oil palm and pulp plantations often
displace villagers and their rattan gardens. An
increase in IPK logging and plantations is assumed,
in the model, to result in decreased availability of
non-timber forest products (NTFPs). We assume in
the model that about 70% of local people are
involved in forest product collection, but that only
10% of migrants collect forest products.
Simulated Land-cover Changes
Under the no plantation development scenario, we
assume that the current secondary forest (about 120
000 ha) can grow into primary logged-over forest
during the simulation, whereas under the other
scenarios, we assume no such land-cover change
because of the high pressure on the forest. Without
plantation development, there is a loss of only about
5% of primary and primary logged-over forest over
40 years, largely as a result of on-going small-scale
agriculture (Fig. 3). The simulations where forest
conversion permits are issued (2–4) suggest a loss
of about 20% of the primary and primary logged-
over forest over 40 years.
Agriculture comprises a very small part of the
landscape initially because of the low population
numbers and the low commercial demand for
agricultural products. With the forest clearance
scenarios, agricultural area increases 4.5 to 11 times
(scenario 2 and 4, respectively), because of
expanding populations (see next section). As land
will become scarce in the legally available area,
between 200 000 and 360 000 ha of forest in the
permanent forest domain will be converted into
agriculture under scenarios 2, 3, and 4. Degraded
forest covers 16 000 ha at the start of the simulation,
but this expands to about 60 000, 85 000, 100 000,
and 140 000 ha in scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4,
respectively, mainly as a result of the increase in
bush fallow.
Fire is not included in the model, and has not been
a feature of Malinau. As such, the amount of forest
lost could be underestimated in the oil palm
scenarios. Fire is a significant threat in other parts
of Indonesia, and forest concessionaires and those
seeking to establish tree crop plantations are
considered major contributors to fire frequency
(Gönner 2000, Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) 2003). Once fire enters the system, it may
remain as a permanent feature (du Toit et al. 2004).
The Department of Forestry and Plantations (1998,
in Casson 2000) holds oil palm expansion partly
responsible for the 1997–1998 forest and land fires
that affected more than 5 million ha of forest in
Kalimantan.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Population Numbers
The total population in Malinau district was 59 212
in 2006 (BPS Malinau, unpublished data) and has
increased by 6.5% yearly over the last 8 years (cf.
Bappeda Tk II Bulungan 1998 in Barr et al. 2001;
BPS Malinau, unpublished data). This high annual
rate of increase is mainly caused by in-migration
related to new economic opportunities. The average
increase in the urban Malinau sub-district was
8.5%–9% compared with 3% in the rural sub-
districts. The model simulates natural growth and
in-migration, and differentiates between local
people and transmigrants. CIFOR researchers
estimate that of the 59 212 in the district about 7000
are immigrants, most living in Malinau town and
some in Long Loreh, where the mining company
was active. In-migration in the model is largely
driven by jobs in IPK logging and oil palm
plantations, where we assume that three people
immigrate for each new job filled by a migrant,
causing the migrant population to rise sharply with
plantation development scenarios (Fig. 4). The total
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Fig. 3. A 40-year simulation of land cover in Malinau district: (a) Scenario 1, No clearing permit given
out; (b) Scenario 2, Forest clearing without oil palm planted; (c) Scenario 4, Plantation development
(high employment).
population in Malinau under the plantation
development scenario will increase by 4.7 (scenario
2) to 13.5 times (scenario 4) after 40 years. After
year 2027 of the simulation, the employment drops
because of the sharp decrease in timber jobs (2027)
when IPK logging stops. For the model, we assume
that, where migrant employment drops under 35%
(meaning less than 35% of employable migrants are
employed), this results in out-migration rates as high
as 2%. Under scenario 4, the now modest number
of 7000 migrants will increase by a factor of 80 after
40 years. Although the local Dayak people are
currently in the majority, they will be a minority if
500 000 ha are planted with oil palm.
Financial Compensation from Logging
Companies to Local Communities
Decentralization not only resulted in district
governments securing a greater share of forestry
revenues, but also had implications for local
communities. A 2000 law entitles communities to
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Fig. 4. A 40-year simulation of total local population (blue lines) and migrant population (red lines) in
Malinau district, under the four different scenarios (1= no plantation; 2 = IPK clearing without
plantation development; 3 = plantation development assuming low employment; and 4 = plantation
development assuming high employment.
demand compensation for timber harvesting from
concession holders, although this law is open to
dispute because of weak enforcement of property
rights (Engel et al. 2006). Andrianto (2006) records
greater conflicts among communities, and
environmental degradation following the implementation
of the new regulations regarding logging, and he
concludes that, in West-Kutai and Malinau districts,
the policies have failed to increase the standard of
living of poor communities. On the contrary, Palmer
(2004) states decentralization has undoubtedly led
to higher capture of logging rents by the Sekatak
community in Malinau. Palmer (2004) and Barr et
al. (2001) indicate mixed outcomes from local
negotiations, Barr et al. (2001:30) noting that many
agreements are “absurd or have been unfulfilled.”
Palmer (2004) mentions IPPK fees of around IDR
50 000/m3 of timber going to local communities.
Although this is low, it is five times more than those
paid by the large logging companies that dominated
the logging industry before decentralization.
Household Income
At the start of the simulation, the percentage of
households was highest in the agricultural sector
(76%) (Table 2). With the exception of scenario 4,
agriculture remains the most important sector
throughout the simulations, although under
scenarios 2–4, the number of households in the
timber sector increases more than tenfold after 20
years (mainly because of IPK). In 2027, the most
substantial number of households will be active in
the oil palm sector in scenarios 3 and 4, although by
2047, this will have shifted to the agriculture and
the trade and services sectors because the number
of jobs in the oil palm sector does not continue to
increase after 25 years even though the population
does. The creation of employment in the region is
substantial under the oil palm scenario, even when
a low employment rate in oil palm plantations is
used. With scenario 1, the total number of formal
jobs available (in mining, timber and civil service)
does not exceed 10 000. In the other scenarios, the
number of formal jobs reaches as high as 22 000
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(scenario 2), 71 000 (scenario 3), and 120 000
(scenario 4).
The significant amount of income generated by
employment in oil palm in year 2027 under
scenarios 3 and 4 is shown in Table 3. There are also
associated expansions in other sectors, driven by the
plantation economy. The income from agriculture
increases substantially, for example. With an
increase in employment, we assume a high demand
for agricultural products and roads opening up the
area improve market access. Where most of current
production is for auto-consumption, we expect an
increase in permanent agriculture and the demise
(in proportionate terms) of swidden cultivation.
Levang et al. (2005) undertook household surveys,
sampling 254 Punan households in six different
settlements in Malinau and neighboring districts.
They found 83% of the sampled households live
under the US$1/day poverty line. Average
household incomes are improved under the oil palm
scenarios (3 and 4), increasing by 60%–150%, but
increasing <10% in scenario 1 without oil palm
(Table 3, last row). Household incomes are also
raised with forest clearing without oil palm
(scenario 2) after 20 years, but once forest clearing
stops, the average incomes decline, and after 40
years, average household incomes are lower than
when no IPK forest clearing had occurred (scenario
1).
The above figures hide the differentiation between
local and migrant households. The activity portfolio
differs substantially for migrant and local
households. Migrants are currently largely urban,
with a high percentage of households active in the
trade and service industries (Table 4). Jobs in the
timber and plantation sector typically go to
migrants, who often have higher schooling levels.
Local people, however, are currently given priority
for all jobs in the civil service, and they are the ones
receiving compensation fees for logging (Table 4).
Local people receive short-term benefits from
scenario 2 (2027), with more commercialized
agriculture, more civil service jobs, and timber fees.
After 40 years, however, they are left with hardly
any forest in proximity to their villages, reducing
their income from forest products and shortening
their fallow periods in shifting cultivation, and
consequently lowering their yields. Migrants will
receive most of the short-term benefits, getting most
jobs in IPK forest clearing. After 40 years, the high
unemployment for migrants will cause some out-
migration, although most are expected to remain; a
portion will buy a piece of agricultural land and start
farming for much lower earnings. This scenario is
expected to cause high levels of conflict.
Scenarios 3 and 4 improve incomes for both local
people as well as migrants. Local people’s incomes
increase most in year 2027 when timber fees
increase >20 times (scenario 4 in Table 3), and drop
thereafter when IPK logging ends. Local household
incomes remain 30%–65% higher than under
scenario 1 at the end of the simulation, mostly
because of commercialization of agriculture,
although jobs in the civil service, trade, and the
service industry also contribute to higher incomes
(Table 4a). Migrants’ incomes are also highest in
year 2027 because of jobs in IPK logging (Table
4b). After the sharp decline in IPK employment,
some of the migrants will obtain employment on the
plantations and some will buy some land for
agriculture. Although incomes may have increased
under oil palm development, overall well-being is
more difficult to judge. Koczberski et al. (2001) and
Casson (2000) report cases of local resentment ove
benefits from oil palm plantations going to
outsiders. Colchester et al. (2006) give examples of
increased social and financial costs with oil palm
arrival. For example, there were social costs of
resolving conflicts over land and benefit sharing
associated with oil palm estates. Air quality
declined, and there was a worrying increase in
alcohol abuse in local communities. More research
is needed on the negative and positive impacts on
local people of oil palm plantations.
District Development
Since Malinau was declared a new district in 1999,
district income has increased dramatically from
only IDR 5.8 billion in 2000 (Barr et al. 2001) to
IDR 405 billion and IDR 615 billion in 2002 and
2003, respectively (Andrianto 2006). Using per ha
and per m3 payments applied to IPPK in Malinau
(Barr et al. 2001), the issuance of IPK permits for
the clearance of 500 000 ha forest will provide the
district with a cumulative income of IDR 703 billion
over 20 years. Under scenarios 3 and 4, an additional
IDR 102 billion is provided over the 40-year
simulation by oil palm production fees. However,
the district income will increase by more than these
fees alone, as the increased economic activity is
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Table 2. Employment in different sectors (number of households per sector), and total population in Malinau
district
No. of Households†
Start Simulation results
2007 2027 2047
Primary a-
ctivities of
households:
1. No
plantation
development
2. Forest
clearing 
without oil
palm plan-
ting
3. Plantation
development
with 0.1
jobs/ha
4. Plantation
development
with 0.2
jobs/ha
1. No
plantation
development
2. Forest
clearing 
without oil
palm plan-
ting
3. Plantation
development
with 0.1
jobs/ha
4. Plantation
development
with 0.2
jobs/ha
Agriculture
and NTFPs
9 900 17 700 21 800 24 700 28 500 31 500 43 000 54 800 76 600
Timber C-
oncession
1 000 1 200 11 100 11 100 11 100 1 500 1 500 1 500 1 500
Plantation 0 0 0 21 100 42 200 0 0 31 600 63 200
Mining 200 300 300 300 300 500 500 500 800
Gov. offic-
ials and
civil serva-
nts
1 300 2 400 3 500 4 200 5 300 3 700 4 300 6 200 9 800
Trade and
service in-
dustries
1 400 4 300 8 900 15 400 22 400 11 300 18 300 35 200 58 700
Total hou-
seholds‡
12 900 23 300 35 700 53 500 72 500 42 200 58 000 95 900 148 400
Total population
60 000 108 600 166 300 249 200 338 100 196 500 270 200 446 700 691 500
† Average numbers of workers per household for the specified sectors are assumed to be as follows:
agriculture – 3; mining and trade – 1; timber plantation and civil service – 1.5 workers per household.
‡ The total of households involved per activity can be higher than the total households because some
households are involved in more than one activity.
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Table 3. Total income (in billions IDR) per sector for all households in Malinau, with the last row showing
averages per household
Simulation results – 2027 Simulation results – 2047
Primary a-
ctivities of
households:
Start of
simulation
(2007)
1. No
plantation
2. Forest
clearing 
without oil
palm plan-
ting
3. Plantation
development
with 0.1
jobs/ha
4. Plantation
development
with 0.2
jobs/ha
1. No
plantation
2. Forest
clearing 
without oil
palm plan-
ting
3. Plantation
development
with 0.1
jobs/ha
4. Plantation
development
with 0.2
jobs/ha
Agriculture 27 51 89 155 245 93 131 382 845
Forest Pro-
ducts
26 45 21 38 36 76 0 17 15
Timber co-
ncessions
13 16 165 162 162 20 20 20 20
Plantation 0 0 0 300 600 0 0 449 899
Mining 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.7
Gov. offic-
ials and
civil service
24 44 66 79 98 68 79 115 181
Trade and
service in-
dustries
16 48 130 248 374 122 249 553 975
Timber fees 2.5 3.0 15.4 52.6 52.6 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7
Total 109 207 485 1034 1569 383 483 1540 2939
Average per
hh
(in millions
IDR)
8.5 8.9 13.6 19.3 21.6 9.1 8.3 16.1 19.8
expected to substantially augment tax payments in
the district. The simulated additional tax payments
over 40 years for scenarios 2–4 are IDR 22 billion,
IDR 149 billion, and IDR 276 billion, respectively.
DISCUSSION
Are Payments for Environmental Services a
Viable Economic Option for the District?
Given the economic attractiveness of the oil palm
development scenario to district and national
government stakeholders, as well as to key local
people (e.g., those who may benefit from land sales
or various illegal transactions), the question is
whether conservationists have alternative development
scenarios. Much is made of direct payments for
environmental services (PES) (Ferraro and Kiss
2002), and one could argue that the global
community interested in biodiversity could change
the incentive structure for local and district
stakeholders by paying for biodiversity services
provided by Malinau. However, the area is vast and
the size of payments (needed to get household
income increases similar to those offered by the oil
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Table 4. Average annual cash income (millions IDR) for (a) local households, and (b) migrant households;
and percentage contribution of each activity to annual income, under four different scenarios
Simulation results – 2027 Simulation results – 2047
(a) Local households Start of
simulation
(2007)
1. No
plantation
2. Forest
clearing wi-
thout oil
palm planting
3. Planta-
tion dev-
elopment
with 0.1
jobs/ha
4. Planta-
tion dev-
elopment
with 0.2
jobs/ha
1. No
plantation
2. Forest
clearing wi-
thout oil
palm planting
3. Plantation
developm-
ent with
0.1 jobs/
ha
4. Plantation
development
with 0.2
jobs/ha
Average annual hh
income
(in millions IDR)
7.8 8.2 9.3 14.6 16.6 8.4 6.7 10.7 13.8
Share from:
Agriculture 28% 27% 32% 27% 28% 27% 34% 41% 43%
Forest products 29% 26% 10% 11% 9% 24% 0% 4% 2%
Timber, plantation,
and mining jobs
7% 4% 4% 15% 20% 3% 4% 12% 17%
Civil service jobs 24% 23% 31% 19% 19% 20% 29% 21% 21%
Trade and service 9% 17% 15% 10% 9% 26% 33% 21% 16%
Timber fees 3% 2% 8% 18% 15% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Simulation results – 2027 Simulation results – 2047
(b) Migrant
households
Start of
simulation
(2007)
1. No
plantation
2. Forest
clearing wit-
hout oil
palm planting
3. Planta-
tion dev-
elopment
with 0.1
jobs/ha
4. Planta-
tion dev-
elopment
with 0.2
jobs/ha
1. No
plantation
2. Forest
clearing w-
ithout oil
palm plan-
ting
3. Planta-
tion dev-
elopment
with 0.1
jobs/ha
4. Plantation
development
with 0.2
jobs/ha
Average annual hh
income
(in millions IDR)
13.8 13.6 19.4 22.3 23.6 13.8 11.2 19.5 21.8
Share from:
Agriculture 11% 13% 10% 10% 12% 14% 20% 19% 26%
Forest products 2% 2% 0% 1% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0%
Timber, plantation,
and mining jobs
37% 24% 54% 57% 57% 16% 5% 37% 34%
Civil service jobs 11% 12% 2% 3% 3% 10% 3% 3% 3%
Trade and service 39% 49% 34% 30% 28% 58% 71% 41% 37%
Timber fees 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
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palm scenarios) would range between US$25–50
million/year. This is probably beyond most budgets
for conservation. The difficulty of securing
biodiversity payments is illustrated by Wunder et
al. (2004).
Carbon (C) PES may have the highest potential for
influencing district decisions regarding forest
conversion. For C payments to provide the district
(i.e., excluding household income considerations)
with the same level of district income as scenario 4,
an average yearly payment of IDR 27 billion would
be needed (about US$3 million/year). According to
de Bruijn (2005), the C content of 1 ha primary forest
is roughly 300 ton C/ha, whereas the C content for
oil palm is 50–125 ton C/ha. A modest estimate of
the amount of C to be saved from being emitted if
the forest is not converted to oil palm plantation is
thus 175 ton C/ha, equivalent to 647 ton CO2/ha(assuming it is mostly primary forest that is lost).
For a total 500 000 ha of primary forest that would
be lost in the plantation development scenario, it
would be possible to recoup the foregone district
income with a C payment, as, at US$2/ton CO2, in
excess of $15 million/year could be generated if the
payments were structured over 40 years. Karky
(2006:14) mentions a “conservative price
assumption” of US$2/ton CO2 on the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) market. Avoided
deforestation is not currently part of the CDM, so
the price would probably be lower, but others talk
of vastly higher prices in the future. Transaction
costs on avoided deforestation would be high. For
example, an elaborate monitoring system would
need to be established to check compliance, but even
then it is possible that C could compete with oil palm
for district income. This PES scenario would not
lead to jobs and higher economic development in
the district. PES scenarios whereby some money is
paid directly to communities would also need to be
explored.
Can Ecotourism and Forest Product
Certification Provide an Economic Alternative
to Oil Palm Development?
Approximate calculations indicate that Malinau
would have to host 50 000–150 000 tourists each
year to generate the household income that the oil
palm scenarios produce (assuming tourists stay on
average 10 days and spend US$30/day that goes to
Malinau households). Malinau has much to offer
tourists with its vast intact forest and cultural
diversity, but despite 19 years of lobbying by a
conservation NGO, Kayan Mentarang National
Park registers fewer than 40 tourists a year
(Iskandar, pers. comm. 2007). Ecotourism will not
be able to compete with oil palm, at least in the
foreseeable future. Furthermore, even under the oil
palm scenarios, most of the district will remain
forested so ecotourism development is not excluded
from these scenarios.
Fair trade labels and natural product labels for forest
products can increase prices, but not to the extent
that would be required if forest products were to
compete with plantations as a source of income for
districts and households. To compete, incomes from
forest products would have to grow at least by five-
to seven-fold. Paz Soldan and Walter (2003) give
an example of certified Brazil nuts in Chile, which
after certification, had a 1.7–2.2 times higher price.
Conservation and Development Trade-offs
Malinau district illustrates the tensions that exist
between conservation and development, but also
illustrates how these trade-offs are perceived
differently by the various stakeholders. Malinau,
with its vast forests is one of the rainforest
biodiversity hotspots of the world (Mittermeier and
Bowles 1993), and conservationists are up in arms
over the proposed plans for logging and conversion
to oil palm (e.g., see Wakker 2006, a study
commissioned by Friends of the Earth). Even
though the head of government in Malinau is willing
to declare the district a “conservation district” (one
of three in Indonesia), he sees no conflict between
this declaration and his support for large-scale
conversion to oil palm. When asked, local people
are all in favor of some form of conservation
measures being taken (Padmanaba and Sheil 2007),
but local people also want the benefits of
development (Levang et al. 2007).
Researchers have witnessed massive change in
Malinau over the last decade (Sayer and Campbell
2004), and it is conceivable that land-use change is
likely to be widespread and accelerating, largely
driven by decisions made in the district capital and
beyond. And these decisions will inevitably involve
logging and plantation development, but perhaps
also mining. Allocating primary and secondary
forest to plantations and other intensive land uses
can be to the benefit of many stakeholders, but it
can simultaneously increase poverty for others. The
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behavior of the plantation concessionaires is crucial
as to the outcomes for local people. Careful
decisions have to be made when selecting
companies for land clearing, and contracts have to
be watertight so that companies deliver on promises.
If companies were to plant oil palm, some local
people see the promise of jobs with higher cash
incomes. District officials see greater economic
activity, more immigrants, and larger district
budgets. Migrants from other more populous
districts see jobs. Some of the income gets back to
the national coffers and the nation’s politicians and
officials see development occurring, which is a
major aspiration. Even with 500 000 ha of forest
cleared, most of the district would remain under
forest at the end of the 40-year simulation period.
If this is the case, then, many would argue that
plantation development scenarios are not at odds
with the district proposal of a conservation district.
But such development does have its risks. First, we
assumed logging stops after 20 years. Second, we
have not factored in fire; if large forest fires enter
the system, as happened in 1997–1998 in other parts
of Kalimantan, then forest quality could be
substantially reduced. Third, with such a large
migrant population under the oil palm scenarios,
future pressures on the environment (e.g., artisanal
gold panning) are likely to increase.
On the basis of economic argument, part of the forest
is likely to be converted, although remoteness and
poor soil quality may keep plantations out of
Malinau for some time. There are social and
environmental costs, not captured in the economic
argument. For example, Koczberski et al. (2001)
and Casson (2002) have both recorded resentment
by local people toward migrants with jobs in
plantations. In Malinau, this could be more extreme
as local people will be quickly outnumbered by
migrants. Colchester et al. (2006) report local
people’s complaints about plantations in other parts
of Kalimantan where individual profit seeking has
replaced traditions of communality and solidarity.
However, Sheil et al. (2006) mention “decision
makers prefer to focus on the general rather than the
particular,” so whether these negative aspects are
taken into account when the decision on
development is made remains to be seen.
If conservationists don’t like the idea of large-scale
land-cover change, do they have alternatives for
those hungry for development? Certification of
forest products and ecotourism alone are not likely
to provide incentives to halt forest conversion.
Carbon payments could conceivably bring district
benefits as high as those derived from logging and
plantations. However, the science and politics of
avoided deforestation is poorly developed, and
requires urgent and major research investment.
Decisions about developing plantations today will
not wait for the long process of international
negotiation on mechanisms for C payments.
The Modeling Process
We reiterate that the model is not meant as a
predictive tool—its primary use is to promote dialog
about alternative trajectories of change. Like any
model, ours makes many assumptions and
simplifications. We have endeavored to make these
assumptions and simplifications as reasonable as we
can, based on the information available to us.
Nonetheless, whether our model yields a credible
representation of Malinau can be questioned by
those who disagree with these choices or who would
emphasize unknowns or uncertainties. For example,
our model cannot be taken as evidence that 500 000
ha of oil palm developments in Malinau will be
commercially successful—this would require field-
based land-suitability evaluations, for example.
Furthermore, a more thorough accounting of the
impacts in each scenario would require
environmental and social impact assessments
focused on the specific areas to be planted in light
of the specific development plans proposed and the
management standards applied—something that we
make no claim to have done. We would obviously
expect that normal processes of civil society
participation should underlie all decision making
and that Indonesian laws regarding the changes in
the status of land be respected.
The modeling process has already achieved some
of its objectives. Debate within CIFOR was
generated by the conflicting perspectives on oil
palm development: as a source of economic
development, and as a cause of forest destruction
and negative impacts on forest-dependent people.
Some scientists pointed to particular reports that
needed to be cited showing the negative impacts of
oil palm, and others requested that those references
be removed because they were based on advocacy
rather than scientific analysis. Very few detailed
impact studies are available, and given the increased
interest in oil palm for biofuel, research on the social
and economic impacts of oil palm is urgently
required.
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The discussions at the district level tended to focus
on in-migration and C payments. District officials
were exceptionally nervous about the immigration
rates that large-scale oil palm plantations would
stimulate, as the district is currently dominated by
Dayaks (who also hold positions of power) and this
could change with high in-migration. The model
filled its role as a means to stimulate discussion, and
helped officials see some of the potential negative
sides of large-scale oil palm development. The
model supported policy changes on land use in
Malinau, tempered local government’s enthusiasm
for oil palm (mostly in relation to migration), and
spurred their interest in PES schemes as an
alternative to oil palm development (Dwi, pers.
comm. 2007). The district head requested help in
using some of the model outputs at the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
in Bali in 2007, so that he could argue the case for
avoided deforestation and a C market. Modeling has
demonstrated its power in generating ideas and
fostering shared understanding, allowing some of
the ramifications of different courses of action to be
explored. It also increases transparency in decision
making. The model identified a number of areas
where further research will be needed if sound land-
allocation decisions are to be made in Malinau.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss2/art37/responses/
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